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ABSTRACT  
Erin Foelker: CHINA AND NATURAL GAS: The Importance of Natural Gas to China 
with Regard to the South and East China Sea Conflicts (Under the direction of Dr. David J. 
Rutherford) 
China has a strong interest in natural gas, as it is a resource of which usage can lead 
to economic growth, energy security, domestic social stability, and reduced climate change 
impacts. One of the best ways for China to gain easier access to this resource is to obtain 
legal rights to what they claim is their territory in the South and East China Seas. In this 
thesis, I review the situations in these two areas and I argue that natural gas is a significant 
motivator for the conflicts that are occurring. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The conflicts over the South and East China Sea regions (I will hereafter refer to 
these regions collectively as the SECSR) are excellent examples of modern wars. Resources 
have always been a large reason for conflict, and they will become more so in the future. As 
climate change and excessive usage of non-renewable resources such as oil and natural gas 
continue to proliferate, resources will play a bigger part in conflicts between states. The 
SECSR conflicts have many different factors that agitate all parties involved such as 
nationalism and power, but this paper will focus on the desire to gain access to natural gas 
resources in both regions. Although it is not perfect in terms of environmental impacts, 
natural gas is an ideal resource to have easier access to for various reasons. This paper will 
specifically focus on various economic values of the resource.  
The SECSR conflicts involve China, Japan, and various other Asian nations, and the 
regions have vast resources and strategic location benefits. China is motivated to grow its 
economy for reasons that will be discussed later, and gaining legal access to these resources 
would be very helpful to accomplishing this goal. One of the most abundant resources in the 
regions is natural gas, a fossil fuel that gives off much less carbon than others. Because 
China is significantly dependent on regions that face instability for fossil fuel access, and 
instability leads to price shocks, it would be in China’s interest to have stronger energy 
 2 
security and become more self-sufficient with its energy needs. This paper will go into more 
detail about how access to the SECSR would give help in China’s economic growth.  
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Chapter 2 
Background 
  
The role of resources in conflict throughout history and in modernity 
 There are many factors to consider regarding the conflict over the SECSR. Much of 
the discussion is based on social, historical, political, and economic factors. However, the 
main goal of this paper is to take a deeper look into how the energy resources in the areas 
affect the conflict, and a brief overview of the general role that resources play in conflicts is 
necessary. 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Arthur 
Westing, “Even when natural resources do not figure prominently as the cause of a war, 
they are often a contributing factor of some significance” (Sharp 2007, 323). Resources play 
a major part in two types of conflicts. One is the type such as the conflict in the Central 
African Republic that took place in 2013. According to an investigation conducted by 
Global Witness, the conflict was fueled by the logging industry, which funded the rebels 
(“Blood Timber”, 2015). This is the type of conflict in which resources are not a core 
reason, but an added “fuel to the fire” so to speak. These conflicts are sometimes driven by 
the illicit practice of extracting and trading these natural resources (Harvey and Mooney, 
2016). A report published by the World Bank compiled data that expressed that countries 
whose economies are primarily dependent on resources are more likely to have conflict (see 
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Figure 2A). The authors hypothesize that this is because rebel groups who lack funding have 
easy access to resources which can in part bankroll their operations (Bannon et al, 2003). It 
is important to note, however, that economies dependent on resources are more likely to 
have economic inequalities (as noted by Peter Lewis in the film (Time to Choose, 2016)), 
which are a source of conflict. The data that the authors compiled is probably illustrative of 
both of these phenomena.  
  
Figure 2A. “Natural Resources and Conflict Risk in Low-Income Countries” (Bannon et al 
2003, 3) 
 The second type of conflict in which resources play a role includes those such as the 
American Civil War, in which much of the conflict was driven by economic demand for 
cotton (Badkar, 2012). A point raised by Jackson and Morelli is “there must be some 
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plausible situations in the eyes of the decision makers such that the anticipated gains from a 
war in terms of resources, power, glory, territory, and so forth exceed the expected costs of 
conflict, including expected damages to property and life. Thus, for war to occur with 
rational actors, at least one of the sides involved has to expect that the gains from the 
conflict will outweigh the costs incurred” (Jackson and Morelli, 2019). It seems unlikely 
that the Chinese would engage actively in the SECSR if they didn’t believe that they would 
gain enough of a financial return through the resources including those of energy. According 
to Professor Jin Canrong of Renmin University, in speaking of the East China Sea conflict, 
“the islands are seen as possessing much more strategic, military and economic value 
because they are about sea-lane security and they may hold vast stocks of hydrocarbons and 
fish” (Huang, 2012).  
 A third type of conflict occurs in cases such as those in the SECSR where there are 
conflicts between states over resources. Barbieri and Reuveny (2014) note that “Theorists 
then pose that states, especially major states, maximize their power relative to others and in 
so doing they compete over resources deemed crucial for power, including by using force. 
Decline in resources at home thus increases the risk of interstate war (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
Van Evera (2001) argues states compete in particular over cumulative resources, which he 
defines as those whose control can ease the acquisition and retention of more resources. 
This competition can lead to war. Lebow (2010) suggests diminishing resources due to 
limited stocks and climate-change impacts may increase security concerns and, therefore, 
the risk of wars in which competition over resources becomes the central objective.” (788).  
 In all of the cases listed above, the resources fuel conflict because they are like a 
Willy Wonka golden ticket to power and economic growth. Resources have always been a 
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source of conflict, but because humanity found effective ways to extract said resources, they 
haven’t been a source of conflict as much as they used to be, and in the 20th century 
conflicts were often related to cultural and political issues. However, as the materials that 
we extract without replenishing (e.g. water and natural gas) start to diminish and even run 
out, resources will again become more important in terms of conflicts. Natural gas is going 
to grow more and more important to all of the countries involved in the SECSR conflicts.  
Background on the South and East China Sea 
 The main purpose of this paper is to illustrate the value of natural gas to China’s 
economy and political system and the important role in that played by the SECSR. 
Consequently, it is necessary to explain the backgrounds and non-energy factors of the 
SECSI conflicts. Although there are differences in the two conflicts, they have notable 
similarities.  
 The East China Sea islands (called “Diaoyu” islands by China and “Senkaku” 
islands by Japan), are a small collection of rocks and “islets” (which are small islands) that 
are located at the edge of Asia’s continental shelf where the shelf meets the Okinawa trough. 
They were claimed (along with the island of Taiwan) by Japan in 1895. After World War II 
ended, America gained occupation over Okinawa, and this included the East China Sea 
Islands for a time. For a while, there was not very much interest in the area, but in 1969 a 
report from the United Nations was published that showed the possibility of the existence of 
vast hydrocarbon resources in the East China Sea, which sparked interest. Eventually the US 
designated control over the islands to Japan through the Okinawa Reversion Treaty (1971), 
and China publicly denounced this action. For a time, the islands belonged to private 
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Japanese owners, but Japan officially purchased them in 2012, and there were protests in 
China (EIA, 2014).  
 China and Japan have been in a power struggle for centuries, and these islands are no 
exception. However, the recent history of their relationship is more complicated than a 
simple power struggle. There are many emotional scars left in China from the Japanese war, 
which makes this issue that much more complicated. Just to add to the complications, as the 
rest of the world has become more globally connected, so have these two economies. In 
2006, China rose to the top of the list of Japan’s trading partners (Yoshimatsu, 2011).  
 
Figure 2B.  Map that Displays Locations of EEZ Border Claims, the Islands, and Oil and 
Gas Fields in the East China Sea Region (Shek, 2019, Edited by David J. Rutherford). 
 Japan and China have been in conflict over a certain legal convention designated 
within the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) called the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (Roy-Chaudhury, 2018). The EEZ designation would give 
the winner of the title rights to utilize the resources within the area, and ownership of the 
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islands would give credence to the legal argument in gaining the desired EEZ entitlement. 
As can be seen Figure 2B above, there is a large geographical discrepancy between the two 
versions of the EEZ borders.  
 The UNCLOS states that the EEZ can either be determined according to the 
midpoint that exists between two countries or it can be seen as the point that extends 200 
nautical miles from the coast belonging to said country, and the continental shelf also plays 
a role. The fact that there are two different legal arguments as to how to determine an EEZ 
has inflamed this particular conflict. China and Japan have conveniently applied the 
respective arguments that give more validation to their ownership of the islands. As Dr. Sun 
Shao-cheng, who is an expert in energy in Taiwan’s Tamkang University said, "Japan took 
the median line principle, but China insisted on configuring its EEZ based on the prevailing 
continental shelf in the shallow East China Sea" (Huang, 2012).  
 Although there are currently estimates of the potential oil deposits located near the 
islands, it has been difficult to say with certainty how much there is, due to the fact that the 
area is known more as a potential natural gas powerhouse and the harsh climate that only 
allows for a short time period in which it can be tested for resources (Feng, 2012).  
 According to estimates provided by the EIA (2014), the area most likely contains 
around “200 million barrels of oil in proved and probable reserves” (2), although certain 
sources in China believe that there may be anywhere from 70 to 160 billion barrels. The 
EIA also states in the report that they estimate there is 1-2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas 
(including proved and unproved), while Chinese sources estimate that there may be 250 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves that haven’t been discovered yet. The EIA report 
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cited the Oil & Gas Journal which stated that in January 2014, China had 155,400 billion 
cubic feet and Japan had 740 billion cubic feet of proven reserves of natural gas (3) (EIA, 
2014). It is important to note that the estimates of resources in the East China Sea region 
may be misleading. Thrall (2013) believes that due to disputes over the EEZ lines, making 
accurate forecasts of the amount of hydrocarbon resources has been difficult, and makes 
important distinctions between “resource base”, which he defines as “the expected volume 
of oil present in the ground” and “reserves”, which he defines as “the amount of oil that is 
technically and economically recoverable, which is generally around 10 percent of the 
estimated resource base in the case of frontier deepwater.” (Thrall 2013, 3). Thrall (2013) 
also states that if Japan had access to the area, building a natural gas pipeline in the East 
China Sea would be expensive and that said natural gas would probably be sent to a refinery 
in China to process. Another factor to note is that even though the majority of the 
hydrocarbon resources are located in uncontested coastal areas, I believe that there would be 
less legal gray areas and potential for conflict for Japan and China if one side had legal 
rights to the disputed areas. 
 The East China Sea hydrocarbon dispute reached a head in 2004 when China began 
the construction of a pipeline to the Chunxiao (Chunxiao/Shirabaka) field, which contains 
natural gas (see Figure 2C below). In 2008 they made an agreement to designate a joint 
development region for hydrocarbons, which is located on a part of the median (according 
to Japan) line (Watkins, 2008) (Figure 2C).  
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Figure 2C. Locations of Oil Fields in the East China Sea with Chinese/Japanese Titles (EIA 
2014, 2).  
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Figure 2D.  Map of the Continental Shelf and Oil and Gas Platforms (Last updated August 
23, 2018) (“UPDATE: Beijing Keeps Busy in East China Sea Oil and Gas Fields.”) 
 China (as of February 2019) has constructed 16 platforms for oil and gas 
development, all of which are located not at the joint development zone (shown in Figure 2E 
below) but close to the (according to Japan) EEZ line. In response to these actions, 
Yoshihide Suga, the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan said that “It’s extremely regrettable 
that China has continued its unilateral development activity” (“Japan Protests Chinese 
Development Work in East China Sea Gas Field.”, 2019). According to a satellite image 
analysis by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the platforms seem to be 
operational (“UPDATE: Beijing Keeps Busy in East China Sea Oil and Gas Fields.”) The 
Chinese estimates show that the trough basin (Okinawa Trough in Figure 2E below) may 
contain natural gas resources of around 17.5 trillion cubic feet and about 20 million oil 
barrels (Chen et al, 2011). I believe that the actions taken by China in this case are most 
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likely an act of spite against the Japanese government, and the fact that Japan hasn’t taken 
similar actions is telling that China may hold the upper hand.  
 
Figure 2E. Map of East China Sea Region Including Joint Development Zone (Schofield 
2011, 12) 
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The South China Sea is an oceanic region between China and a number of Southeast 
Asian countries. EIA estimated that there is (including both proved and probable 
speculations) oil reserves of 11 billion barrels and natural gas reserves of 190 trillion cubic 
feet. However, there was an energy consultancy called Wood Mackenzie that only estimated 
2.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent proved reserves of both oil and gas (EIA, 2013). 
Schofield (2011) makes an important note that “the industry rule of thumb is a 10% 
recovery rates for frontier provinces” and also that “recovery rates from gas fields tend to be 
significantly higher than for oil fields (75% vs 10%)” (20). It is also important to note that 
the area is an important global shipping route, through which one third of commercial 
thoroughfare passes, and that “about 80 percent of China’s oil imports arrive via the Strait of 
Malacca, in Indonesia, and then sail across the South China Sea to reach China (“Explained: 
South China Sea Dispute”, 2019).  
 
Figure 2F. Map of the South China Sea (Mollman, 2019). 
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There have been small conflicts within this larger one. Some examples are two 
incidences of Chinese boats that intimidated survey vessels from Vietnam and the 
Philippines (Schofield, 2011). US State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus made the 
statement, “China’s actions undermine regional peace and security [and] impose economic 
costs on Southeast Asian states by blocking their access to an estimated $2.5 trillion in 
unexploited hydrocarbon resources” (Mollman, 2019). The US, although never making an 
official alignment with any of the countries on this issue, has ordered “Freedom of 
Navigation” operations. The Chinese government has spoken out against US involvement in 
the issue, believing that the US has acted “provocatively” (“Explained: South China Sea 
Dispute”, 2019). 
 According to the BBC, “China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and 
Brunei all have competing claims” in the region (“Why Is the South China Sea 
Contentious?”, 2016). The SECSR conflicts are similar in that both of the areas are likely 
more valuable due to natural gas resources than oil. However, Thrall (2013) notes that 
because the relations the countries involved in the South China Sea conflict have with the 
United States are less strong than between Japan and the US, he implies that being involved 
in the South China Sea conflict would be less politically dangerous for China than its 
involvement in the East China Sea conflict. Finally, Thrall (2013) argues in contrast with the 
main argument given in this paper, that the resources are not a main cause of the conflict, as 
he cites Victor (2007) in saying that “As a body of resource security research has suggested, 
resource disputes rarely create conflict where tensions do not already exist, suggesting that 
resource issues tend to exacerbate existing geopolitical tensions rather than create them 
independently” and that the “resources are typically divisible, not zero-sum. There are 
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plenty of established options for dividing the resources” (7). Thrall (2013) believes that the 
main goal of China is to gain dominance in the region, although resources are a factor of 
said dominance. I disagree with the argument that the resources are zero-sum and thus are 
not a main cause of the conflict. It is an unlikely outcome that the two countries (China and 
Japan) will decide to equally divide the region and its resources, at least in the near future, 
as this would cause great political and military ramifications (which in effect would also 
cause economic ramifications). Therefore, whoever gains ultimate political legitimacy over 
the region would also gain ultimate ownership of the resources. One of the valuable aspects 
of the hydrocarbon resources are the accessibility and the lowering of transportation costs. 
Whoever the “winner” of this political battle would have easier access to the potential 
resources with low transportation costs. 
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Chapter 3 
China’s Drive for Natural Resources 
China’s motivations for economic growth 
 Many cultural, economic, and political factors exist that motivate the Chinese 
government to grow their economy, a goal which would be facilitated by the acquisition of 
natural gas.  
 The miracle of economic growth in China over the last few decades has been 
groundbreaking. The economic policies such as that of the state-controlled economy during 
the Mao Zedong era from the forming of the PRC in 1949 until his death in 1976 were quite 
damaging, but there still was remarkable effort from the citizens to industrialize the country, 
and in the 60s and 70s the state heavily invested in human and physical capital. Shortly after 
the death of Mao Zedong, the government under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping decided to 
gradually allow more policies in accordance with the market system and allow more foreign 
investment. These policies allowed China to transform from a low-income economy to an 
upper-middle-income country in 2010 (according to the World Bank standards). From the 
time that these economic reforms began in 1979 until 2018, the growth of the economy was 
an average of 9.5% (Morrison, 2019). Morrison (2019) also states that “economists 
generally attribute much of China’s rapid economic growth to two main factors: large scale 
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capital investment (financed by large domestic savings and foreign investment) and rapid 
productivity growth” (pg. 6).  
 However, Chinese economic growth has slowed down in recent years, and the IMF 
predicted in the April 2019 World Economic Outlook that in 2024 the Chinese economy 
will only grow 5.5% (Morrison 2019, 5). The Chinese government has taken actions such as 
the “Made in China 2025” plan, which aims to modernize 10 important sectors and play a 
bigger role in the world economy (Morrison, 2019).  
 Chinese society is largely based on Confucian philosophy, similar to the way that 
Judeo-Christian philosophy influenced western society. The main philosophies of 
Confucianism, Buddhism, Legalism, and Taoism have influenced Chinese societies and 
emphasized the concept of “harmony”, a concept which influenced policy throughout 
Chinese history. The Chinese governmental system, although not a democracy, still requires 
the approval of its citizens in order to sustain its legitimacy. The term “harmonious society” 
began to be used very frequently in the late 1980s (Delury, 2008). Delury (2008) also states 
that “social harmony is a platform for broadening the party’s mandate from managing 
economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s to stewarding socio-economic development for the 
twenty-first century: and that “the promise of a more harmonious society reaches out to 
farmers angry about rural poverty and corruption, to the middle classes anxious about social 
conflict, and to everyone suffering from environmental degradation. It offers an olive branch 
to critics of authoritarianism while simultaneously indicating to CPC hard-liners a 
willingness to be tough, brutal even, if “harmony” demands it.” According to Liu and Qiu 
(2008), the Chinese government has three goals in their security and social control policy, 
two of which are “to ask the CPC to improve Chinese people’s standard of living as a 
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primary tool to solve many other social problems” and to “increase the legitimacy of the 
Chinese government and law enforcement agencies”.  
 What the authors meant by “legitimacy” is that if the government protects the 
economic interests of its citizens, there will be “social harmony” (meaning a lack of protests 
in this context) and the government will hold legitimacy with them. In order to advance the 
goal of economic growth, it is necessary to ensure both energy security and environmental 
protection. In 1996 the Chinese government formally stated “sustainable development” is 
the fundamental factor of the country’s development (Hu et al, 2014). In a white paper 
published in 2012, the Chinese government stated that the usage of fossil fuels has an 
impact on the ecosystem and that the task of ensuring energy security will grow more and 
more difficult as China continues to urbanize and industrialize (“China’s Energy Policy 
2012 White Paper Complete Transcript”, 2012).  
 There are several helpful methods in ensuring the development of the Chinese 
economy upon which the government has focused. One of the most important steps is the 
development of infrastructure. According to Geethanjali et al (2010), “direct investment on 
infrastructure creates (i) production facilities and stimulates economic activities; (ii) reduces 
transaction costs and trade costs improving competitiveness and (iii) provides employment 
activities to the poor” (pg. 3), and “the emergence of China as the world factory would not 
be possible without a range of new economic infrastructure services in place” (pg. 9). In the 
last century, the central government made significant investments in railway transport 
infrastructure and heavy industries (which were aided by the railway transport network) 
(Démurger, 2001). 
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 One of the most challenging problems that the Chinese government currently faces is 
the startling economic inequality, particularly between the landlocked western regions and 
the eastern regions that are near the ocean, a phenomenon which has been growing 
especially severe since the 1990s (Démurger, 2001). The economy has also been 
transitioning from labor of “low-productivity agriculture to higher-productivity industry and 
services” (pg. 1669); agriculture’s share in the economy lowered from 70% to 45% from 
1978-2005 (Holz, 2008). In order to ensure this important transition, it will be critical to 
ensure both the quality and quantity of infrastructure.  
 In pursuit of improved infrastructure in all economic sectors, three benefits exist 
with respect to utilizing natural gas as opposed to more polluting resources: (i) less carbon 
emissions when using natural gas in the construction process, (ii) less carbon emissions due 
to using natural gas for the operations of infrastructure and (iii) less damaging impacts from 
pollution upon infrastructure.  
 Natural gas can be used in the making of steel instead of “coke,” and it has become 
attractive to U.S. steel production companies. Coke is an energy product which is made 
from coal (Schlueter, 2016) but prices for coke have risen due to the high usage of coal in 
building infrastructure in China. Natural gas has become cheaper, especially due to the 
fracking boom in the U.S. (James, 2012). If China also utilizes natural gas as opposed to 
coal more in the steel making process, this will be a large step in reducing coal usage, and 
therefore carbon emissions.  
 Another important infrastructure project is building railways to make for 
transportation of humans and products. China is highly dependent on this form of 
transportation, as opposed to the American dependence on airplanes. There is a form of 
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railways called high speed lines, in which it is possible to use an electric grid to power the 
operations, making natural gas an option (as opposed to other higher-carbon options) (Pike, 
2019).  
 When there is high coal and automobile usage, acid rain and pollution get more 
severe (Nunez, 2019). Acid rain can be detrimental to concrete (Ditao et al, 2017), which is 
an important element of infrastructure such as dams and bridges. One way to reduce acid 
rain would be to use electric cars (and use less coal and oil in the electricity grid). China has 
said that it “wants to phase out gas and diesel vehicles within the next few decades” 
(Clemente, 2018).  
Potential uses for natural gas 
 Although there has been significant economic growth for China over the years, there 
have been some areas that are lacking that the government can help improve upon. There is 
still a significant amount of inequality, and there are also sectors in which China can utilize 
natural gas to help grow the economy.  
 The economies of China’s large cities’ have grown astronomically since the 
economic reforms began, but there are significant regional inequalities (Démurger, 2001).  
Many people in rural areas are flocking to the cities, even with the household registration 
system, which “creates a bond between rural populations and their villages, and without it, 
rural-urban migration would be on a much larger scale than we are currently witnessing” 
(Ong 2014, 163). It would be very much in China’s interest to develop the rural areas in 
order to prevent cities from becoming too crowded, which would help both the rural and 
urban areas. This development will require significant levels of construction, and Crane and 
 21 
Mao (2015) note that “Coal-burning household furnaces and stoves are difficult to outfit 
with pollution control equipment, as are boilers used to heat residential and commercial 
buildings; in most instances, substituting natural gas or propane is the most efficient way to 
reduce pollution from these sources.” (pg. viii) 
 One factor that has led to the significant growth besides the globalization of the 
economy was the heavy investment of infrastructure, which became quite significant in 
1998. After the Asian financial crisis, for most East Asian countries, infrastructure 
investment significantly decreased, but China didn’t take that route. This infrastructure 
investment was a large factor which made it possible to heavily develop China’s 
manufacturing sector (Liu, 2005). Fujita et al (2012) make an estimation with a basis on the 
National Bureau of Statistics (of China) data that “capital investment had contributed to 
45% of the annual GDP growth during 2000-2007, whereas household consumption and 
exports had contributed to 30% and 25%, respectively” (pg. 756). Liu et al (2012) note that 
investing in infrastructure requires products which require much energy to products such as 
steel and cement, and that high speed railways, a popular form of transportation, require the 
electric grid and require energy for the cement and steel production which are materials 
needed for the construction. 
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Figure 3A.  China’s Growth in Manufacturing from 1980-2017 (Colotla et al 2018)  
As can be seen in figure 3A above, China’s manufacturing industry has become a 
formidable force in the world economy. Although Chinese leadership wants the economy to 
be based more significantly on “services and domestic consumption” than manufacturing, 
China is still an important part of manufacturing in the world. As of 2018, China made up 
27% of the global manufacturing sector (Colotla et al 2018) and the country still has much 
to gain from a more developed manufacturing sector. 
One important step to reducing pollution and usage of fossil fuels is the switching 
over from regular cars to electric vehicles. China has a goal of making electric as well as 
plug-in hybrid vehicle sales one fifth of total auto sales by the year 2025 (Chen and Munroe 
2017).  
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Figure 3B. “Vehicle ownership per 1000 people versus GDP per 1000 people in China for 
1997-2016” (Cai et al 2019, 8) 
 As can be seen from figure 3B above, as the Chinese economy has grown, so has 
vehicle ownership in large cities. Ou et al (2014) did a study that predicted that by 2050 
there would be 300-463 vehicles per 1000 people (300 would be a low growth and 463 
would be a high growth scenario).  If these were all electric vehicles the cities would have 
much less of a pollution problem. As Lin and Wu (2018) note, “concerns of smog are now a 
powerful motivation for the urban residents to adopt EVs” (pg. 239).  
 It is important to note that it would be difficult to calculate to what extent a cheaper 
and easier access to natural gas supply would be helpful in certain industries such as 
infrastructure and electric cars. However, access to natural gas would be potentially useful 
in these industries that will grow more and more important in the future to China, so it 
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would be very helpful to gain access no matter the extent to which the resource would aid in 
the growth of these industries.  
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Chapter 4 
Natural Gas in China 
Natural Gas 
 Although the SECSR potentially contain a considerable amount of oil, the key 
resource to pay attention to is the natural gas reserves. Not only do they seem to be more 
abundant than the oil reserves in both regions, but China has strategic interests for pursuing 
this specific resource. Most countries wish to reduce their impact on climate change, but 
China has particular need in this regard due to its high coal usage. Consequently, access to 
natural gas is a way to quickly resolve this issue and other energy issues that China faces.  
 According to Shabaz and Solarin (2015), “natural gas consumption emits 50% less 
environment pollution compared to other fossil fuels” (pg. 835). This factor alone would 
make it an ideal option for China to use, but there are certain factors of China’s geography 
that make it difficult to obtain natural gas, which makes imported LNG a good option. 
However, dependence on foreign LNG sources also has its costs, so this makes access to 
natural gas in the SECSR especially valuable to China.  
 Natural gas usage is becoming more and more popular all over the world, and China 
is no different. Although production in China grew over three times from 2003 to 2014,. 
consumption grew at an even faster rate (see figure 4A below). The growing consumption 
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for natural gas is evidence that the government has a strong interest in gaining easier access 
to the resource.  
  
Figure 4A. “China’s natural gas production and consumption, 2000-2013” (EIA 2015, 15) 
 Natural gas as of 2017 made up around 6 percent of China’s energy mix, but in June 
2017 the Chinese government made the goal of ensuring that by 2030 it would rise to 15 
percent (VanderKlippe, 2017). In 2018 the consumption in China was about 280 billion 
cubic meters (BCM) (Aizhu, 2019 (b)), but the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), which is one of the largest energy enterprises in China, estimated that by 2030 the 
consumption of gas would go up to 440-520 BCM, and that this will require significant 
updates of infrastructure such as pipelines and underground gas storage (Hove et al, 2017).  
 There are various methods of developing natural gas, such as extracting from shale, 
which is a type of rock from which natural gas, oil, or both can be developed (EIA, 2019), 
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both onshore (which is referred to as “drilling deep holes under the earth’s surface”), and 
offshore (which is referred to as “drilling underneath the seabed”) (“What is Onshore 
Drilling Versus Offshore Drilling?”, 2019). In 2018 shale gas made about 7% of China’s gas 
production. But an optimistic prediction that shale gas production in China by 2035 would 
make up 23% of gas output was given by Zhao Wenzhi, one of China’s Academy of 
Engineering’s researchers and higher up at PetroChina (one of the largest energy enterprises 
in China). China’s president Xi Jinping in 2018 made a call to action to step up natural gas 
activities in order to make China more energy independent. However, Lin Boqiang of 
Xiamen University is not as optimistic as Zhao Wenzhi, and believes that “The investment 
is still too small as only a handful of state-run companies are exploring it ... Technology 
progress is not fast enough” (Aizhu 2019 (a)).  
 According to Forbes (2019), although China has a considerably large amount of 
shale resources, there are a few problems such as mountainous terrain and population 
density, not to mention that “The geology has experienced multi-stage deformation” and 
“That makes it much more challenging in terms of the continuity of the layer. Ideally you 
want to find a horizontal layer that you can drill into continuously and then fracture. In 
China it is hard to find those continuous layers,” according to Yanpeng Sun, who is a 
Chinese geologist.  
 Although natural gas is in many ways an ideal energy source for China to consume, 
the country is still dependent on importations, which occurs in the form of liquefied natural 
gas. This is complicated for the heavily regulated and mostly government-controlled energy 
sector. As can be seen in figure 4B below, many of the regions that China is dependent on 
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for the resource are somewhat at risk for instability, which will be further discussed later in 
this paper.  
  
Figure 4B. “China LNG import sources, 2014” (EIA 2015, 26) 
 In 1964, the first commercial shipping of liquefied natural gas or LNG called the 
CAMEL project successfully transported gas to France and the UK from Algeria. LNG was 
a monumental technological development, because before then there was no way to 
transport natural gas other than through pipelines, and it opened up the natural gas industry 
to world trade (Jensen, 2004). Due to Panama Canal’s expansion, it has become more cost 
effective for Asian countries to purchase LNG from the US Gulf Coast, although China 
mainly purchases LNG from Australia and Qatar, as they hold contracts that have extended 
time periods with these partners (Hove et al, 2017).  
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 According to Hove et al (2017), “In 2016, China’s gas imports were approximately 
evenly split between pipeline and LNG sources” and those pipelines import natural gas from 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Myanmar. This is an option that the government 
seems to favor, as in 2016 it made reforms on pipelines pricing (Hove et al, 2017). 
However, currently Burma (Myanmar) has discord between the government and the 
Rohingya minority, and Turkmenistan has an authoritarian regime under which there has 
been protests due to economic troubles (Stronski, 2017). The potential conflict which may 
cause natural gas prices to go up makes access to natural gas in the SECSR more 
advantageous than pipelines (at least for pipelines in conflict-ridden or potentially conflict-
ridden regions). 
Environmental motivations for searching for natural gas in the region 
 In addition to economic and geopolitical factors to consider, China has a great 
interest regarding protecting its environment in acquiring more natural gas. Natural gas in 
certain factors is much cleaner than traditional energy sources and compared to coal emits 6-
55 times less PM (particulate matter) (Kim et al, 2018). China has great interest in reducing 
its pollution.  
 China, as is the case with many other developing countries, currently faces many 
environmental issues. Perhaps the most important and visible of these issues is air pollution. 
Official data reported that out of the 74 cities that were monitored by China’s Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, there were only 8 of them that were up to the standards set by the 
state regarding air pollution (Stanway, 2015).  One study found that in 2015, China faced 
1.1 million deaths attributed to air pollution (Health Effects Institute, 2017). This problem is 
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only exacerbated by the fact that the country is currently facing an aging population due to 
effects of the one-child policy (Chongsheng and Lok-to, 2019). An aging population will be 
more sensitive to air pollution than a younger one will, and it is expected that the health 
issues that China faces regarding the air pollution will get more intense by 2030. (Health 
Effects Institute, 2016) This isn’t just a social issue, it is also an economic concern to the 
government. China doesn’t have universal healthcare, but the government still contributes to 
healthcare costs (Zhou, 2018). As the population ages and there are more people who face 
health issues due to air pollution, healthcare costs will rise and the government will have 
less funds to give to economic development.   
 The Chinese government has many other motivations for reducing the country’s 
pollution levels. In 2014, the Ministry of Environmental Protection monitored 74 cities, and 
only 8 of those cities passed the state air quality standards (Stanway, 2015). Stanway (2015) 
notes that researchers in the government warned that “any failure to tackle China’s huge 
pollution problems in the coming years could stoke public discontent and create ‘social 
conflicts’”.  In order to solve the pollution issues, the government has taken steps such as 
signing the Paris Climate Accord, and planning out a future where cars that only use fossil 
fuels will be nonexistent in the country, and as an economist with Societe Generale notes, 
“Chinese people are very concerned about pollution, so it makes sense for the leading party 
to respond [because] what’s most important to [the party] is social stability” (Shane, 2017). 
Included in the pledges under the Paris climate agreement is “a determined switch from coal 
to gas, in heating and electricity” (Forbes, 2019).   
 Although there are pros and cons to dependence on natural gas, there are many 
reasons for China to find a way to lessen its dependence on coal, and natural gas seems like 
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one of the most viable options that exist at the moment. It is important to note that there is 
cause for concern regarding natural gas, as in the process of production, it leaks a gas called 
methane, which traps much more heat than carbon dioxide does. It was estimated in a study 
done in coordination with over a dozen research centers including the Environmental 
Defense Fund (Allen et al (2018) as cited in Kusnetz (2020)) which estimated that in 2015 
the natural gas industry leaked around 2.3 percent of the natural gas (which leaks methane), 
and one of the scientists involved in the study named Lyon said that “Probably the average 
national loss rate is low enough that there are immediate climate benefits of replacing coal 
with gas”, and also stating that “it’s going to be close”. It is important to note that improving 
technology in the natural gas production process can reduce leakages (Kusnetz, 2020).  
 Although natural gas has methane issues, coal has many downsides. Fujita el al 
(2012) notes that China’s heavy dependence on coal results in detrimental health and 
environmental effects, one of which is acid rain. From 2002 to 2010 land that had serious 
acid rain which had an average yearly pH below 4.5 went up from 4.9% to 6.1% (Niu et al, 
2017). Gao et al (2017) believe that acid rain will be a long-term problem as fossil fuel 
usage continues to increase. Acid rain can damage the surfaces of buildings and statues, and 
corrode metal, which requires an increase in the costs to maintain such structures. It can also 
cause harm to plants and wildlife, which has negative effects for the agriculture industry 
(“Effects of acid rain”). Acid rain is caused by atmospheric water vapor combining with 
nitrogen oxides and sulphur oxides, which are given off by coal production. However, 
natural gas production doesn’t give off sulphur oxides, and the nitrogen oxides given off in 
the process are 80% less than those of coal (“Gas Basics”).  
 32 
It was mentioned earlier that coal production emits more particulate matter than 
natural gas, and PM 2.5 is an example of harmful PM. As can be seen in figure 4C below, 
reducing dependence on coal would be really beneficial to reducing PM 2.5 emissions.  
 
Figure 4C. “Comparison of Emissions from Different Fuels” (“Case Studies in Improving 
Urban Air Quality.”, 7) 
 PM exposure (especially to PM 2.5) can cause detrimental health effects such as 
strokes, heart attacks, and possibly asthma (“Our Nation’s Air”, 2017).  Braathen and Roy 
(2017, pg. 22) estimate that the economic losses due to the costs that result from premature 
deaths resulting from “ambient particulate matter pollution” was equal to 7.9% of China’s 
GDP that year. Guan et al (2016) make an important estimation regarding the economic loss 
due to lack of work time because of illness from “particulate air pollution”, which the 
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authors estimated was equal to about 1.1% of the national GDP in 2007, and they note that 
this loss was about equal to Vietnam’s total GDP in 2010!  
 If China wishes to truly reduce its effects on climate change, switching from coal to 
natural gas seems to not be the best step in the right direction (as current technology 
permits). However, pollution seems to be the most important factor in the maintenance of 
social stability because it affects everyone’s health and wellbeing in the short term. In this 
regard, switching to natural gas is a way to calm the waters in the short term while 
transitioning out of dependence on fossil fuels in the long term. 
 Competitive motivations for gaining access to natural gas 
 In addition to concerns of dependence on resources located in unstable regions or 
regions that have conflict with China, there are also geopolitical factors that China must 
consider in the journey towards less dependence on foreign energy sources.  
 China has begun a policy called the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). According to 
Jin et al (2018), “In 2013, the B&R initiative was introduced in China, aiming to enhance 
connectivity and cooperation among participant countries by building infrastructure, 
increasing cultural exchange and broadening trade” (pg. 336). Farooki (2018) states that the 
initiative “involves Chinese investment, mainly in infrastructure projects along the old silk 
route. Hard infrastructure (roads and rail networks) are accompanied by trade and 
transportation agreements, that President Xi sees China in a leadership role on the global 
stage, and part of that is delivered through the BRI,” and that’ BRI is also a tool to cement 
foreign relations and partnerships” (Farooki 2018, 7). Jin et al (2018) also state that energy 
security is a key goal in the initiative of this policy, that China will be able to get more 
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access to natural gas through pipelines with countries involved in the initiative, and that this 
will allow China to be less dependent on LNG from other countries, and that this initiative 
will make China’s energy supply more diversified.  
 Many of these countries involved in the BRI have access to valuable resources, both 
energy and otherwise. For example, Peng Qiming, the head of the China Mining Association 
states that “Many Chinese mineral companies are cooperating with leading global players to 
jointly make and process metals in other countries,” and Chile’s vice-minister of mining 
Pablo Terrazas believes that demand for lithium would rise due to China’s growing 
development of electric cars powered by the resource (Yukun notes: Chile is the greatest 
exporter of lithium in the world) (Yukun, 2018).  
 The BRI is an example of China’s journey to becoming a superpower, a goal that is 
motivated largely by desire for economic growth and stability. If China has more access to 
resources from the SECSR, they will have more negotiating power with countries involved 
in the BRI to gain easier access to resources such as valuable minerals. For example, say 
that there was an African country that had access both to oil and to a mineral resource that 
was helpful in making semiconductors, and China really wanted some of its firms to have 
access to that mineral resource. If China already had enough energy supplies through access 
to natural gas and oil resources in the SECSR, they would have an easier time getting lower 
prices for the mineral resources in a trade deal with said African country. This mineral 
resource would help China be more economically competitive, especially in the technology 
sector.  
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 One important region that China desires to gain influence in is Central Asia. China 
has a long history of relations with Central Asia through the Silk Road trade that began over 
2,000 years ago. The relationship waxed and waned over the centuries, but then in 
contemporary times, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Central Asia became more 
open, and in 1992 China and five countries in Central Asia established diplomatic relations. 
It is important to China to have good relations with the Central Asian region to combat the 
East Turkestan terrorist group and other security threats (Guang 2007). According to Chung 
(2004), “Pursuing “new regionalism” in Central Asia would also ideally group countries of 
the SCO into a ‘pole’ in a ‘multi-polar’ world, to undermine what the Chinese perceive to be 
American global domination” (p. 993). From my understanding, “Multi-Polar” refers to 
China’s definition of how the government says that they don’t want one global superpower 
but many powers in the world. China also has good energy relationships with Central Asian 
countries such as natural gas pipelines from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan (Jin 
et al 2018). Jin et al (2018) also state that “with this varied group of suppliers, China is 
trying to build a network of energy importation involving the Middle East, Central Asia, 
Africa and other regions to diversify its supplier mix so that the possible failure of any one 
exporter will not cut off an adequate supply of energy” (p. 341).  
 China and Pakistan have had a great relationship for a long time, as “Pakistan was 
one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1950 and remained 
a steadfast ally during Beijing’s period of international isolation in the 1960s and early 
1970s”, and China has contributed on large infrastructure projects for Pakistan such as 
power plants and gold mines; Husain Haqqani, the former ambassador of Pakistan to the 
US, said in 2006, “For China, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India” (Afridi 
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and Bajora, 2010). Pakistan has faced an energy crisis (Kugelman, 2013), and if China had 
access to cheap energy sources, they could help Pakistan with such problems. Besides 
Pakistan, if a country faced a similar crisis and if China had access to energy, this could be a 
bargaining chip for them to gain access to the region’s other resources or simply to bolster 
better relations. 
 Russia has about 25% of the world’s natural gas reserves (“The World’s Biggest 
Natural Gas Reserves”, 2013). Although Russia and China would seem to be allies without 
any conflict (as they are both distrustful of the west), they have been competitive in their 
journey to gain influence in Central Asian countries such as Kyrgyzstan. Putin wants to 
bring states that used to be part of the Soviet Union back under Russian influence, while 
China wants stability and economic influence in the region, and “in China’s view, its 
economic rise depends on the degree of influence that it can wield over the region that 
bridges Asia and Europe” (Tan, 2020). If China has access to more natural gas and won’t 
have to be dependent on Russia in the future for this resource, the country will be more able 
to provoke the relationship with Russia by competing with Russia for power in Central Asia. 
 It is no secret that China and America have competition regarding many facets. 
When Bill Maher was interviewing Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo, who wrote a book 
called “Winner Take All” about China’s drive for geopolitical power, Maher noted that 
“[China] seems to get something we don’t- that power, really, in this age is about 
economics. We seem to be the muscle-bound wrestler, you know. We think power is having 
a giant army” (Dambisamoyo, 2012). The recent trade war seems indicative that the conflict 
between the two countries will only grow more and more as economic power, as opposed to 
ideological/political power, reigns supreme in the modern world. This conflict has also been 
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influential in the energy sector. In August of 2018, US crude oil exports to China went down 
to zero (although they eventually rose), and that same month, China decided to impose a 
25% tariff on US oil products (Jong Oh et al, 2019). It is really dangerous for China to not 
have a secure energy supply in the times where trade wars can cause China not to have 
access to needed energy sources. 
One important factor in the conflict between the U.S. and China is the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. It’s no secret that the U.S. and Iran have a shaky relationship. Garver 
(2013) notes that Iran’s biggest foreign investor in its energy sector became China and that 
“Beijing views Iran as an important partner, current and future, which shares with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) many common interests and perspectives, which has 
substantial comprehensive national capabilities and which offers China good prospects for a 
long-term partnership as China rises” (p. 70). But also, China must be careful regarding its 
relationship with Iran not to shake up the U.S. relationship. If China had access to more 
energy resources, it wouldn’t care as much about being dependent on the resources that the 
U.S. would supply and would be able to strengthen the relationship with Iran. 
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Chapter 5 
Dependence of resources in unstable regions 
 In 2015, Vice News did a piece on Boko Haram and the fight against the movement. 
One of the interviewees was a Chadian colonel named Azem Bermandoa, a spokesperson 
for the army, who was critical of what he believed to be Nigeria’s reluctance to attack Boko 
Haram, as at the time Chad was being very heavily attacked by the terrorist group. He said 
which was translated by Vice News as “If a fire starts burning down your neighbor’s house, 
you should go help put it out, or else the fire will reach your house” (Vice News, 2015). 
This is true to China in two senses regarding unstable regions. It is, as all countries are, 
afraid of instability from other countries reaching their borders. However, the perhaps more 
prevalent fear regarding instability is the presence of it in regions that contain important 
resources, specifically energy sources, which can cause the fluctuations of prices (Iyer et al, 
2018). This is an important consideration regarding the resources in the islands. If one of the 
countries doesn’t have to depend on resources from unstable regions, or they have a 
stockpile that will prevent a crisis in case of a destabilizing political event in one or more of 
the regions, this is a considerable motivator in the struggle to win ownership of the SECSR.  
 China in particular has two different types of concerns regarding instability in 
resource-rich regions. One kind is domestic, and the other is foreign. In particular, the 
western region of Xinjiang, with which the central government has tension (“Why is there 
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Tension Between China and the Uighurs?”, 2014), supplies a large amount of oil to the 
country. This region has had instances of terrorism from separatist groups, which frightens 
the central government (Raman, 2002). If the country didn’t have to be as dependent on the 
region for the resource, it would lessen the pressure to the central government on making 
those in the region act according to its wishes.   
 Xu et al (2014) notes that China’s main oil “import sources are focused on some 
politically unstable regions, such as the Middle East and Africa” and that “the oil supply is 
susceptible to emergencies and political sanctions” (pg. 8330). Hove et al (2017) explains 
that China has been strategizing for a long time to make its natural gas portfolio more 
diversified, and Qatar, which China is considerably dependent on natural gas for, had 
“recently faced geopolitical instability”.  
 As Li et al (2018) state, “the effect of uncertainty regarding international oil price 
movements on economic growth is gradually strengthening. Hence, the stability of energy 
supply is an increasingly serious issue in China” (pg. 326). As can be seen in the figure 
below, the oil price often spikes when there is a conflict in a region which produces large 
amounts of oil supplies, so it would very much be in China’s interest to reduce its 
dependence on natural gas and oil from these politically unstable regions.  
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Figure 5A. Variations of the Prices of Crude Oil Corresponding with World Events (BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2018, 20) 
 The dependence on fossil fuels will likely grow much stronger, and the availability 
of these resources will decrease. It will be necessary for China to safeguard their economy 
against the effects of price shocks due to instability.   
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 It is a safe prediction to say that demand will go up for natural gas in the near future, 
and it would behoove any country in the age of climate change to consider this resource 
more seriously. There are several factors which ensure the fact that China has a vested 
interest in securing access to it, as it will help contribute to economic stability. Some 
examples are economic competitions such as the trade war with America and the potential 
economic depression that will come from the Coronavirus pandemic. Every country has an 
interest in economic growth, but the Chinese government has special reasons for making 
this a huge priority, and these reasons are unlikely to change in the near future. It is in every 
country’s interest to more closely look into and invest in more environmentally friendly 
energy sources, and China is no different.  
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